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Top Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities
The competition for oil and gas leases has resulted in an increase in the
use of top leases to secure oil and gas leasehold estates. Top leases which
are found to violate the Rule against Perpetuities could result in the loss of
millions of dollars to the lessee.
The author examines top leasing in light of the Rule against Perpetuities
and concludes that absent a savings clause, such leases violate the Rule. A
savings clause is proposed which would save an otherwise invalid lease
thereby circumventing the harsh application of the Rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of mineral development, a top lease is defined as,
"[a] lease granted by a landowner during the existence of a re-
corded mineral lease which is to become effective if and when the
existing lease expires or is terminated."' Basically, a top lease
arises when a subsequent lease is acquired on mineral interests
which are subject to a valid, existing prior lease.2 The existing
prior lease is referred to as the bottom lease.
Two types of top leases are generally recognized: a two-party
top lease and a three-party top lease.3 A two-party top lease in-
volves the same parties in interest as in the bottom lease. The
same lessor grants a second lease to the same lessee, covering the
same interests as the bottom lease, but prior to the first lease's
expiration or termination. The following is an example of this
type of top lease.
Mineral owner 0 leases his interest to X Oil Co. for a primary term of
five years commencing August 1, 1973, and provides for a royalty of one-
eighth of production. X Oil Co. maintains the lease by proper and timely
1. H. WILLIAMs & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 777 (5th ed.
1981) [hereinafter cited as H. WII"aMS & C. MEYERS].
Frankfurt v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436, 445 n.23 (10th Cir. 1960) provides a more
lengthy definition of top leasing-
In the oil and gas vernacular to toplease is to secure a lease on land cov-
ered by an existing lease to the end that the toplease will be effective after
the expiration of the existing lease and the interest of one or more lessees
thereby eliminated. Top leasing has the same invidious characteristics as
claim jumping.
Id.
2. Brown, Effect of Top Leases: Obstruction of Title and Related Considera-
tions, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 213 (1978); Ernest, Top Leasing - Legality v. Morality, 26
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 957 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Ernest].
3. Brown, supra note 2, at 2].3; Ernest, supra note 2, at 958.
payment or tender of delay rentals for each year in advance in accordance
with the terms of the lease which is the customary "unless" form. The
last delay rental is paid to cover the period commencing August 1, 1977.
The lease will expire August 1, 1978, in the absence of production or opera-
tion. X Oil Co. considers O's property a valuable prospect, but its man-
agement is uncertain that operations can be commenced in time to
prevent the expiration of the 1973 lease. In order to retain ownership of
the working interest, X Oil Co. persuades 0 to execute a new lease for a
primary term of five years effective May 1, 1978. X Oil Co. does not release
the 1973 lease. The top lease from 0 to X contains a number of provisions
that are significantly different from the corresponding ones in the 1973
lease, the most important of which is a royalty of three-sixteenths. X Oil
Co. is finally able to begin operations in mid-July 1978, in accordance with
the terms of both leases.
4
At this point the question becomes, which lease terms control?
The answer is obviously of paramount importance to both parties.
In a three-party top lease, the original lessor executes a subse-
quent lease in favor of a lessee not a party to the first lease.5 The
same lessor leases to two different lessees, one of which was not a
party to the first or bottom lease. The three-party situation arises
as follows:
Mineral owner 0 leases his interest to X Oil Co. for a primary term of
five years to run from June 1, 1973. Then while the first lease to X is still in
effect, the same mineral owner leases the same interest to Y Production
Corp. for a primary term to run from June 1, 1975.6
Top leasing as a means of acquiring new oil and gas interests is
becoming more common as unleased oil and gas prospects be-
come increasingly scarce.7 The difficulty posed by this situation
is that unless care is exercised during drafting, such top leases
are likely to be held in violation of the Rule against Perpetuities
under California law.8 If a top lease violates the Rule, then that
lease will be void and the lessee will not acquire an oil and gas
leasehold interest as intended.
At the time oil and gas leases are acquired, it is extremely diffi-
cult to ascertain the value of the leasehold estate. The market
value of the leasehold estate as exploratory acreage may be nomi-
4. Brown, supra note 2, at 214; Ernest, supra note 2, at 958.
5. Brown, supra note 2, at 213; Ernest, supra note 2, at 958.
6. Brown, supra note 2, at 213.
7. See Ernest, supra note 2, at 968-70.
8. Jones, The Rule Against Perpetuities as it Affects California Oil and Gas
Interests, 7 U.C.L.A. L REV. 261, 278 (1960).
Suppose an oil and gas lease which is to commence upon the termination
of an existing lease with a "thereafter" clause. Since the "thereafter"
clause creates the possibility that the existing lease will not terminate and
the second lease commence within the permissible period, the second
lease presumably would be void in California under the Haggerty case,
and the prediction of one writer that a "subject to outstanding lease" reci-
tal would save the second lease seems unlikely to come true in this state
if Haggerty remains the law.
Id.
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nal or is questionable at best. Once the leasehold estate has been
explored by drilling, in the event oil and gas is produced in paying
quantities, the leasehold estate will be worth millions of dollars.
Therefore, any challenge to the title of the lessee is more likely to
occur after the increased value of the leasehold is recognized and
becomes a reality. Any successful challenge to the leasehold at
this point, which finds the lease invalid because it violates the
Rule against Perpetuities, would result in substantial economic
loss to the lessee. Because it is practically impossible for the
lessee to cure this defect in title, the lessee would lose the lease
entirely, consequently losing the potential economic benefit of
production of millions of barrels of oil and gas during the lease
period. For example, an oil and gas lease covering 1,280 acres in
an exploratory area may realistically be acquired for aproxi-
mately ten to twenty dollars an acre, totaling $12,800 - $25,600.9
Upon discovery of oil and gas in paying quantities, this lease may
be worth hundreds of millions of dollars depending on the
amount of oil and gas reserves discovered underlying the entire
leasehold.'0 Consequently, in order to avoid loss of a potentially
valuable lease, it is imperative to be certain that a top lease is
valid before acquiring it.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the application of the
Rule against Perpetuities to top leasing, and possible methods of
drafting such leases to avoid the harsh consequences of violating
the Rule. This article will also examine the application of the
Rule to. oil and gas leases in California, where the habendum
clause" provides for a primary term' 2 of a stated period of time,
9. Interview with Edward C. LeLouis, Attorney, in Bakersfield, California
(Nov. 4,1982).
10. Assuming a total lease of 1280 acres is productive, a 400 barrel per acre-foot
recovery factor, 200 feet average thickness of producing interval, and a net price
(after deducting costs of operation) of $20 per barrel, the total oil produced from
the lease would be worth $2,048,000,000. ((400)(200)(1280)($20) = $2,048,000,000).
Interview with William D. Newsom, consulting petroleum engineer, in Bakersfield,
California (Nov. 10, 1982).
These figures do not take into consideration the life of the field and a discount to
present value.
11. "Habendum clause" is defined by H. WiLAms & C. MEYERS, supra note 1,
at 332 as follows:
The clause in a deed or lease setting forth the duration of the grantee's or
lessee's interest in the premises. A typical habendum clause in an UNLESS
LEASE (q.v.) provides as follows:
"It is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for a term of ten years
from date and as long thereafter as oil, or gas, of whatsoever nature or
and a secondary term13 of "so long thereafter 14 as oil and gas is
produced."
In rare instances, oil and gas leases may exist where the haben-
dum clause only provides for a specifiedperiod of time, and does
not provide for a secondary term of "so long thereafter as oil and
gas is produced." The Rule will be inapplicable if this specified
time period does not exceed the period permitted by the Rule.
However, if the period is in excess of the time permitted by the
Rule, the Rule may be controlling.
II. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES APPLIED TO Top LEASING 1 5
The Rule against Perpetuities was designed to prevent the crea-
kind, or either of is produced from said land or drilling operations are con-
tinued as hereinafter provided."
Id.
12. "Primary term" is defined by H. WnIIeAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, at
570-71 as follows:
The period of time, typically five or ten years, during which a lease may be
kept alive by a lessee even though there is no production in paying quan-
tities by virtue of drilling operations on the leased land or the payment of
rentals. After the expiration of the primary term, the lease usually can be
kept alive only by production in paying quantities (q.v.) absent some sav-
ings clause in the lease, such as a shut-in gas well clause, drilling opera-
tions clause or continuous drilling operations clause (q.v.)....
For purposes of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, the phrase "primary
term" has been said to include the entire period in the life of the lease
prior to the period of extension because of production.
Id.
13. "Secondary term" is defined by H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, at
682, as follows:
The period subsequent to the expiration of the primary term during which
the lease or deed is continued in force by operation of the thereafter
clause (q.v.) of the lease or deed.
Id.
14. ' Thereafter clause" is defined by H. WILAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1,
at 767-68, as follows:
The lease clause providing for continued validity of the lessee's interest
subsequent to the expiration of the primary term "so long as" a specified
state of affairs ,continues, e.g., so long as there is production in paying
quantities, or so long as drilling operations are prosecuted. The haben-
dum clause of a contemporary lease provides in general as follows:
"It is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for a term of ten years
from date [the primary term] and as long thereafter as oil, or gas, of what-
soever nature or kind, or either of them is produced from said land or
drilling operations are continued as hereinafter provided."
Id. [hereinafter cited as "so long thereafter"].
15. For further discussion of the Rule, see generally J. GRAY, THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942) (hereinafter cited as GRAY]; L. SnVIES & A.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1201-1298 (2nd ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited
as SIMES & SMITH]; 6 AMERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24, at 3 (1952); Leach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REv. 638 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Leach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell ]; Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L.
REv. 973 (1965). For discussion of the Rule against Perpetuities with regard to oil
and gas, interests, see generally I. KuNrrz, LAw OF OIL & GAS §§ 17.1-17.4 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as KuNrz, OIL & GAS]; Jones, The Rule Against Perpetuities as it
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tion of contingent future interests which may vest too remotely.
The underlying policy of the Rule against Perpetuities is that so-
ciety's best interests are served by promoting the alienability of
property in commerce by preventing interference with the aliena-
tion of property beyond a certain period of time.16 The Rule and
its underlying policy are firmly entrenched in the common law.
As stated by Gray, the Rule provides: "No interest is good unless
it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest."17
Most states have adopted a statutory form of the Rule. The Cal-
ifornia statute provides as follows:
No interest in real or personal property shall be good unless it must vest,
if at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of
the interest and any period of gestation involved in the situation to which
the limitation applies. The lives selected to govern the time of vesting
must not be so numerous or so situated that evidence of their deaths is
likely to be unreasonably difficult to obtain. It is intended by the enact-
ment of this section to make effective in this State the American common-
law rule against perpetuities. 18
It is important to remember that the Rule against Perpetuities
is not a rule invalidating interests which last too long, but rather,
is directed at invalidating interests which vest too remotely.'9
This vesting requirement is met only when it is certain, at the
time the instrument creating such interest takes effect, that the
interest being created will vest within the period of the Rule.20
That the interest created might vest is not sufficient; it must be
Affects California Oil and Gas Interests, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 261 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as JONES]; Kuntz, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Mineral Interests, 8
OKLA. L. REV. 183 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Kuntz, The Rule Against
Perpetuities ]; Simonton, Oil and Gas Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 25
W. VA. L. Q. 30 (1917) [hereinafter cited as Simonton].
16. Ku'rz, On. & GAS, supra note 15, § 17.1, at 388. This policy was enunciated
in a case concerning oil and gas matters, Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.
1936). The court in Weber stated:
The rule against perpetuities springs from considerations of public policy.
The underlying reason for and purpose of the rule is to avoid fettering real
property with future interests dependent upon contingencies unduly re-
mote which isolate the property and exclude it from commerce and devel-
opment for long periods of time, thus working an indirect restraint upon
alienation, which is regarded at common law as a public evil.
Id. at 808.
17. GRAY, supra note 15, § 201, at 191.
18. CAL. Crv. CODE § 715.2 (Deering 1971).
19. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, supra note 15, at 639. One author has sug-
gested that it would have been more appropriate to have called the Rule against
Perpetuities the "Rule against Remoteness." GRAY, supra note 15, at 4.
20. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, supra note 15, at 642.
certain that the interest created will vest, if at all, within the pe-
riod of the Rule.21 Simply stated, the Rule against Perpetuities is
"the law limiting the time within which future interests can be
created."22
The same rules that apply to grants and exceptions of other in-
terests in land have been applied to determine the validity of
grants and exceptions or reservations of separate interests in oil
and gas.23 The Rule against Perpetuities clearly applies to oil and
gas leases, and such leases will be held void if they violate the
Rule.2
4
The Rule against Perpetuities becomes an issue in top leasing
situations in the following manner. A top lease will usually com-
mence upon the expiration of the bottom lease, which contains a
"so long thereafter" 25 term (secondary term) 26 in the habendum
clause.27 The "so long thereafter" term creates the possibility
that the bottom lease will not timely terminate in order to allow
the top lease to commence within the period of the Rule (this is
so because under the "so long thereafter" term, production of oil
and gas in paying quantities may go on indefinitely). When this
occurs, the top lease is void in California under the Rule against
Perpetuities. 28 Further, a "subject to outstanding lease" recital is
not likely to save the top lease under California law.29 A top lease
21. Id.
22. GRAY, supra note 15, at 4. There appears to be no simple way to explain
the Rule against Perpetuities; volumes have been written on the subject. See
supra note 15.
23. 1A W. SUMMERS, OIL & GAS § 134 (1954).
24. Id. See generally Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation Dist., 51 Cal. 2d 33, 330
P.2d 775 (1958) (action to quiet title to oil, gas, and mineral rights); Rousselot v.
Spanier, 60 Cal. App. 3d 238, 131 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1976) (a deed which excepted and
reserved oil and gas rights, creating a present vested possessory interest, was not
a violation of Rule); Keville v. Hollister Co., 29 Cal. App. 3d 203, 105 Cal. Rptr. 238
(1972) (grantor's retained power to enter into and execute leases and agreements
concerning minerals did not violate Rule); Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., 125
Cal. App. 2d 222, 270 P.2d 604 (1954) (grantee's interest in minerals was contingent
and therefore void under Rule against Perpetuities); Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal.
App. 2d 541, 114 P.2d 646 (1941) (oil and gas lease which might vest beyond period
of Rule against Perpetuities violated Rule).
See also KUNTz, On. & GAS, supra note 15, §§ 17.1-17.4, at 388-98; Jones, supra
note 15; Kuntz, The Rule Against Perpetuities, supra note 15; SIMONTON, supra
note 15.
25. See supra note 14.
26. See supra note 13.
27. See supra note 11.
28. Jones, supra note 15, at 278.
29. Id. Brown, Effect of Top Leases; Obstruction of Title and Related Consider-
ations, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 214, 227 (1978).
IT] he argument has been advanced that execution of a top lease contain-
ing language which conditions its taking effect "subject to" the subsisting
bottom lease will avoid clouding the title of the bottom lessee Under an
"unless" form lease instrument. On the other hand, it is argued that the
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is subject to a bottom lease whether or not this is expressly
stated in the top lease, since the bottom lease is prior in time
(and recording) to the top lease.
There is ample authority to support the view that upon the exe-
cution of an oil and gas lease, the lessee takes a vested interest in
the land for the purposes of the lease.30 This vesting occurs be-
cause the right to explore is not inchoate, and is therefore vested
from the time the lease is executed. 31 However, under an exe-
cuted top lease (while the bottom lease is in effect) the top lessee
has no right to explore or enter the leased premises until after the
bottom lease has terminated. Since the vesting of the top lease is
contingent upon the occurrence of "an uncertain future event"
(the cessation of production in paying quantities), it is subject to
the Rule against Perpetuities. Under the "so long thereafter" 32
provision of the habendum clause,33 the top lease cannot vest un-
til oil and gas production 34 or drilling operations have ceased,
thereby terminating the bottom lease by its terms. The condition
precedent may not occur within the period of the Rule, and there-
fore, the top lease may be declared void under a strict application
of the Rule against Perpetuities since the rights in the top lessee
will vest too remotely.35 The Rule can be stated as follows: "[ilt
is perfectly clear that, if a lease for years is granted to take effect
recital that a top lease is to take effect upon expiration of the bottom lease
violates the Rule against Perpetuities. Considered theoretically, this lat-
ter assertion is correct because the effective date of the top lease is uncer-
tain and may never occur.
Id. Contra, KuNTz, OIL & GAS, .upra note 15, § 17.2, at 391; Ernest, supra note 2.
30. W. SUMMERS, supra note 23, § 171, at 496. See also Callahan v. Martin, 3
Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935); Pimental v. Hall-Baker Co., 32 Cal. App. 2d 697, 90
P.2d 588 (1939); Jones v. Piers, 124 Cal. App. 444, 12 P.2d 646 (1932).
31. W. SUMMERS, supra note 23, § 171, at 497.
32. See H. WILIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, at 767-68.
33. See H. WuuAMs & C. MEYERS, supra note 11, at 332.
34. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, at 576-77. Without a further defini-
tion in the lease, "production" sufficient to keep a lease alive after the primary
term has expired, is generally interpreted to mean production in paying quanti-
ties, i.e., production in sufficient quantities to provide a return in excess of operat-
ing costs. Id.
35. To comply with the Rule, an interest has to become "vested" within
the period of perpetuities. An interest is "vested" for purposes of the Rule
when the following conditions exist:
a. any condition precedent attached to the interest is satisfied, and
b. the taker is ascertained, and
c. where the interest is included in a gift to a class, the exact amount
or fraction to be taken is determined.
Id.; 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoPERrY § 24.18, at 56 (1952).
on a condition precedent which may not occur within the period
of the rule, it is bad."36
A determinable estate is created in the lessee where the haben-
dum clause states that the lease term is for a certain period of
years or so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced therefrom. 37
The interest remaining in the lessor is a possibility of reverter,38
which is not subject to the Rule against Perpetuities because
36. SIMES & SMITH, supra note 15, § 1242, at 153. See also GRAY, supra note 15,
at 353, where it is stated:
This lease appears to be in a usual form for a reversionary lease, in which
the term granted is to begin on the termination of the existing term ....
He seems, however, not to consider the presence of an existing term as
significant for the question of the validity of the future term; and his opin-
ion indicates that he considers that the future term would be outside the
scope of the Rule against Perpetuities, for the reason that it was presently
vested, even if there were no term preceding it. This view, it is submitted,
is incorrect. The future term, without any subsisting intermediate term,
would not be a vested interest for the purposes of the Rule against Perpe-
tuities. Such a term may be spoken of as a "vested interest" in some con-
nections, but it is not vested in a strict sense for the purposes of the Rule.
Id.; 2 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) [hereinafter cited as TIFFANY];
Isen v. Giant Food, Inc., 295 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (interest which had to vest
within a reasonable time was within period of Rule); Cities Service Oil Co. v. So-
hio Petroleum Co., 345 F. Supp. 28 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (application of provision in
reservation by assignor as to new leases would violate the Rule); Singer Co. v.
Mahad, Inc., 213 Kan. 725, 518 P.2d 493 (1974) (lease agreements to take effect on
completion of shopping center were not void in violation of the Rule as a reason-
able time for performance was implied in the provisions); Montgomery Ward &
Co., Inc. v. Crossroads Shopping Center, 620 P.2d 40 (Colo. 1980) (shopping center
lease option requiring determination before 21 year period not void in violation of
Rule). But cf. Wong v. Di Grazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241
(1963) (ten-year lease to commence upon completion of building not void under
Rule where all rights established by agreement arose within 21-year period); First
& C Corp. v. Wencke, 253 Cal. App. 2d 719, 61 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1967) (contract provi-.
sion giving vender a specified amount of office space in new building to be con-
structed and yearly option to renew from date thereof violated the Rule); Haggerty
v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958) (lease to commence on
completion of building was not vested and violated Rule). Cf. FLA. STAT. § 689.22
(1979) (lease to commence in the future is exempt from the Rule against Perpetu-
ities but invalid unless the term commences within forty years from the date of
execution of the lease).
37. Montana-Fresno Oil Co. v. Powell, 219 Cal. App. 2d 653, 666, 33 Cal. Rptr.
401, 409 (1963). The defendant contended in this case that the habendum clause in
the original lease created a title in fee on condition subsequent rather than a de-
terminable fee which would therefore have entitled defendant to a notice of de-
fault. The plaintiff claimed that the habendum clause created a determinable fee
which would have caused defendant's interest to cease upon the first or a later pe-
riod of total cessation of production and thus no notice was required. The court
held:
It is our holding that the habendum clause created an estate determinable
upon a special limitation applicable both to the primary and the "thereaf-
ter" term and that the notice requirement contained in paragraph 21 re-
lates to the covenants numbered 1 to 30 and does not operate to change
the interest of the defendant to an estate on condition subsequent.
Id.
38. GRAY, supra note 15, §13, at 8.
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such interest in the lessor is vested,39 and the Rule is concerned
only with those interests which are not vested. It is argued that
because a reversionary interest in the lessor is alienable, the
holder of such an interest may grant an oil and gas lease as a par-
tial alienation of this reversion, thereby avoiding the application
of the Rule against Perpetuities because it does not apply to re-
versionary interests.40 However, in California, the issue is not
what the lessor has to grant, but rather, when does the lessee's
interest vest? One must be cognizant of the fact that a possibility
of reverter is exempt from the Rule, but an executory interest to
take effect upon the same contingency is not exempt from the
Rule.4 1 The lessee's interest under a top lease is an executory in-
terest and, therefore, subject to the Rule against Perpetuities.
Further, if that interest vests too remotely due to a condition
precedent which may not occur within the period of the Rule,
then the interest is void.,
. Top leases may be subject to problems of interpretation and va-
lidity for reasons other than those involving perpetuities viola-
tions. The grounds for attack on the top lease may be due to
obstruction of a first lessee's title, cloud on title, or problems of
substituted contract theories and novation issues. However,
these issues are beyond the scope of this comment.42
A. California's Treatment of Top Leases
California has not specifically dealt with the issue of top leasing
39. Id. § 113.3, at 105-07. See also 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.62, at 150.
40. Ernest, supra note 2, at 962; Kuntz, The Rule Against Perpetuities, supra
note 15, at 186; Brown, supra note 2, at 227. Contra Jones, supra note 15, at 278.
41. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.62, at 151. The example is stated as
follows:
A, owner in fee simple, conveys "to the B Church in fee simple so long as
the premises are used for church purposes, and when the premises cease
to be so used then to C in fee simple." The gift to C is void under the Rule
against Perpertuities. However, the B church is given only a fee simple
determinable; and A has a possibility of reverter, unlimited in time, which
is exempt from the Rule.
Id. The gift to C in this example is analogous to a top lease and the conveyance to
the B Church is analogous to the bottom lease.
42. See generally Brown, supra note 2; see also Twyford v. Whitchurch, 132
F.2d 819 (10th Cir. 1942); Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 297 F. 422 (8th Cir.
1924); Robinson v. Continental Oil Co., 255 F. Supp. 61 (D. Kan. 1966); Shell v.
Goodroe, 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1946); Simmons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d
419 (1932).
as a violation of its Rule against Perpetuities. 43 The situation is
analagous to California's treatment of "on completion" leases
which, under an application of traditional property concepts, were
found to violate the Rule against Perpetuities.44
The case of Haggerty v. City of Oakland4 5 was decided under
these traditional property concepts. The case involved a lease for
a ten year term which was to commence upon the completion of a
building. The court held that since the commencement of the
term was delayed until completion of the building, the lease was
void because this condition precedent might not occur within the
permissible period of the Rule.46 The court emphatically stated
that leases are subject to the Rule against Perpetuities 4 7 and fur-
ther stated that "[i]f, at the time of the creation of the interest,
there exists any possibility at all that the interest involved may
not vest within the prescribed period, the rule has been violated,
and the grant must fail."48 The defendant in Haggerty argued
that the lessee obtained a vested right upon the final adoption of
the ordinance awarding the lease. Therefore, he argued, the Rule
against Perpetuities did not apply. Although it is true that vested
interests are not subject to the Rule, the court held that the inter-
est created by the lease was not a vested interest since the ten-
ancy would take effect upon the occurrence of an uncertain
event-the completion of a building.49 The Haggerty court stated
that:
There seems to be relatively few cases discussing this problem, but the
recognized legal authorities in the field of future interests agree that such
an interest is not vested, and that, if a lease for years is granted to take
effect on a condition precedent which may not occur within the period of
the rule, it violates the rule and must fall.S0
The remaining question in Haggerty was whether or not, upon
execution of the lease, any possibility existed, no matter how re-
mote, that the estate might not vest within twenty-one years. The
43. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d
957 (1958). Contra Wong v. Di Grazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241
(1963); Note, Rule Against Perpetuities: Applicability to Commercial Leases, 6
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 165 (1959). See also Prime v. Hyne, 260 Cal. App. 2d 397, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 170 (1968).
45. 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958).
46. See supra note 44. Haggerty has been severely criticized, but has not been
overruled and leads one to the conclusion that under traditional property concepts
"on completion" leases may still be found void due to perpetuity problems. See
infra note 59 and accompanying text.
47. 161 Cal. App. 2d at 417, 326 P.2d at 964; Epstein v. Zahloute, 99 Cal. App. 2d
738, 22 P.2d 318 (1950); Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114 P.2d 646 (1941).
48. 161 Cal. App. 2d at 418, 326 P.2d at 964.
49. Id. at 419, 326 P.2d at 965.
50. Id. See SIMES & SMrrH, supra note 15, § 1242, at 153-54; GRAY, supra note
15, at 353; TWFFANY, supra note 36, § 406, at 170-72.
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court held that "[ilf the slightest possibility exists that the estate
will not vest within the prescribed period, the rule has been vio-
lated."5' The problem of delayed commencement of a lease is
analagous to the uncertainty of the vesting of the top lessee's in-
terest. Because it cannot be determined when oil and gas produc-
tion will cease, thereby causing termination of the bottom lessee's
interest under the "so long thereafter" term, the top lessee's in-
terest may vest beyond the period of the Rule making the lease
void.5 2 The Haggerty court dismissed the defendant's argument
that the use of the term "due diligence" meant a requirement of a
reasonable time and any time longer than twenty-one years
would be unreasonable as simple and unsound logic.5 3
The California court modified the Haggerty rule in the case of
Wong v. Di Grazia. 5 4 The parties in Wong entered into a written
agreement wherein the defendant agreed to lease to the plaintiff,
for a period of ten years, a building to be constructed by the de-
fendant. The major contention at trial was the validity of the
agreement under the Rule against Perpetuities. The court held
that a ten year lease, to commence upon the filing of a notice of
completion of a building to be constructed on certain property,
was not void under the Rule against Perpetuities where all rights
established by the agreement arose within the twenty-one year
period, and any breach of the agreement would be remedial
within such period.55 The court further stated that the nature of
the transaction was such that the contemplated building was to
be completed within a reasonable time, and that such reasonable
51. 161 Cal. App. 2d at 420, 326 P.2d at 965.
52. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
53. 161 Cal. App. 2d at 420-21, 326 P.2d at 966.
This argument is deceptively simple, and is unsound. The courts are not
permitted to relax the rule against perpetuities. The people have spoken
by adopting the constitutional provisions, and the Legislature has reaf-
firmed that position as late as 1951. The rule itself contains no exceptions,
and the courts should not create them. The rule has developed over a
long period of time. It is predicated on fundamental principles of public
policy. Once an exception is created to the application of the rule, no mat-
ter how innocuous it may seem, no one can foretell where it may lead, or
how it may be abused....
Id. But cf. Isen v. Giant Food, Inc., 295 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1961), where the court
held an agreement to "diligently pursue" a pending zoning application and subse-
quently execute a lease requiring the zoning to be obtained within a "reasonable
time" to be within the period of the Rule.
54. 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1963).
55. Id. at 527-28, 386 P.2d at 819, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
time was less than twenty-one years, thereby causing the interest
to either vest or fail within the statutory period.
The court in Wong rejected the plaintiffs argument that con-
struction would not be completed within twenty-one years due to
the use of such terms as "forthwith" and "continue expeditiously"
in the language of the lease. The court found that the use of these
terms imposed an obligation on the defendant to complete con-
struction within a reasonable time. The court's reasoning was as
follows:
Courts and scholars almost unanimously agree that provisions which
make vesting contingent upon performance within a reasonable time, or
some equivalent phrase, do not violate the rule "if in light of the surround-
ing circumstances, as a matter of construction, a reasonable time is neces-
sarily less than twenty-one years."... Many courts, in fact, presume that
a "reasonable time" is less than the period of the rule. In any event, a rea-
sonable time in the present transaction in the light of the circumstances
must necessarily be a period far less than 21 years. We cannot accept that
portion of Haggerty v. City of Oakland which expresses a contrary posi-
tion and, to that extent, it is disapproved.56
Although the Wong court disapproved of the reasoning in Hag-
gerty, it has not actually been overruled. In the 1967 case of First
& C Corporation v. Wencke 5 7 the court followed Haggerty in find-
ing that an option for a year to year lease of office space in a
building yet to be constructed was within the Rule against
Perpetuities.5 8
The distinction between Wong and the cases of Haggerty and
First & C Corporation appears to be in the "forthwith" and "con-
tinue expeditiously" language of Wong. Applying this reasoning
to top leases leads to the conclusion that Wong is inapplicable
since terms such as "forthwith" and "continue expeditiously"
have no bearing on the cessation of the production of oil and gas
in paying quantities pursuant to the "so long thereafter" term.
Because this cessation of production may not occur within a rea-
sonable time (the time permitted by the Rule), 59 the exception
set forth in the Wong case will not apply to save a top lease in
California.
B. Treatment of Top Leases in Other Jurisdictions
The case law involving top leasing, as it relates to the Rule
against Perpetuities, is limited but generally finds top leases to be
56. Id. at 536-37, 386 P.2d at 825-26, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 349-50.
57. 253 Cal. App. 2d 719, 61 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1967).
58. Id. at 725, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 536. "We are inclined to agree that the option for
the year-to-year lease after construction is within the rule against perpetuities, as
asserted by plaintiff." Id.
59. Obviously the bottom lessee could stop production and thereby terminate
the lease, but it is unlikely a lessee would do so.
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in violation of the Rule against Perpetuities. An overview of treat-
ment of top leases in other jurisdictions reveals that few cases
have directly addressed the issue. There are also cases which
hold that arrangements similar to top leases are covered by the
Rule.
In the case of Melcher v. Camp, 60 a five day option to acquire a
lease including the same terms and conditions as the first lease,
where the period of the first lease was for one year and "so long
thereafter as oil and gas, or either of them is produced from said
land by the lessee," was found to violate the Rule. The court held
"that a contract for an ordinary oil and gas lease to vest in the fu-
ture creates such an interest in real property as is sufficient to in-
voke the rule against perpetuities as a rule of property. '6 1 The
court followed the rule that, as applied to interests in land, "[a] ny
limitation or provision, the purpose or possible effect of which is
to cause an estate to commence in the future, is invalid if, as a
result thereof, an estate may commence more than twenty-one
years after a life or lives in being."62
Melcher was followed by Cities Service Oil Company v. Sohio
Petroleum Company63 which involved an overriding royalty inter-
est reservation. In Cities Service the assignor of an assignment of
an oil and gas lease reserved an overriding royalty interest and
provided that any new lease or leases covering the lands assigned
acquired by the assignee or a third person for the assignee's ben-
efit, was deemed to continue and preserve the assignor's reserved
rights. The court reasoned that the assignee could have held the
oil and gas lease by continued production (i.e., kept the lease
alive by continuing to produce oil and gas in paying quantities)
for an interminable number of years, and his assignee might not
have been alive at the creation of the assignor's reservation; and
more than twenty-one years after assignee's death, his assignee
may have obtained a new lease which would allow assignor's re-
served interest to vest.64 The court held that "[t]his would be be-
yond and after the period of time of some life in being and
twenty-one years after Plaintiffs [assignor's] reservation created
60. 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1967).
61. Id. at 114.
62. Id. (quoting Estate of McCray, 204 Cal. 399, 268 P. 649 (1928)).
63. 345 F. Supp. 28 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
64. Id. at 30.
in its [Plaintiff's] assignment to Boyle [assignee]."65
In cases such as Melcher and Cities Service, the future interests
created are subject to conditions precedent which may not occur
within the period of the Rule against Perpetuities, thereby
preventing them from vesting within the period of the Rule. Top
leases are interests taken subject to a condition precedent which
may not occur within the period of the Rule (that is, termination
of production in paying quantities). Following the reasoning of
Melcher and Cities Service, these interests will be void as viola-
tions of the Rule.
Top leases were clearly stated to violate the Rule against Perpe-
tuities in the case of Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Duncan. 66 One of
the requirements for the commencement of the top leases, "to
have and to hold ... for a term of one (1) year ... from and after
the expiration of the existing oil and gas lease, whichever is the
later,"67 was found to violate the Rule against Perpetuities. The
court's reasoning was as follows:
The top leases were taken in June of 1975 when there were existing base
leases, the primary terms of which would expire in August of 1975. Hence,
the possibility existed in June, 1975 that a well could be commenced
before the expiration of the existing base [bottom] leases, the same could
be drilled to production and the ensuing life of production could possibly
exceed the period permitted by the Rule. The second alternative provi-
sion in the top leases thus appears to violate the Rule unless the top
leases are reformed under the foregoing statutory authority.68
The court in Stoltz found the top leases to be in violation of the
Rule and, pursuant to its reformation power,69 reformed the
65. Id.
66. 417 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
67. Id. at 556.
68. Id.
69. The Oklahoma court relied on three statutes, 60 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60,
§§ 75, 76, 77 (West 1971). These three sections provide:
Any interest in real or personal property that would violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities shall be reformed, or construed within the limits of
the Rule, to give effect to the general intent of the creator of that interest
whenever that general intent can be ascertained. This provision shall be
liberally construed and applied to validate such interest to the fullest ex-
tent consistent with such ascertained intent.
Id. at 75.
To effectuate the provisions hereof, all courts of this state are, within their
otherwise jurisdictional limits, hereby granted the power to reform or con-
strue interests in real or personal property, as provided in Section 1
hereof, in accordance with the doctrine of cy pres.
Id. at 76.
If an instrument violates the Rule Against Perpetuities, but can be re-
formed or construed in accordance with the provisions of this act, it shall
not be declared totally invalid. Rather, the provisions thereof that do not
offend the Rule shall be enforced, and only the provisions thereof that do
violate, or might violate, the Rule shall be subject to reformation or con-
struction under the doctrine of cy pres within the terms of this act.
Id. at 77.
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leases to give effect to the "general intent" of the lessor. The
court followed the doctrine of cy pres7 O which carries out the in-
tention of the party as nearly as possible when it would be impos-
sible or illegal to give full effect to the instrument involved.7 1
In Francis v. Superior Oil Company, 72 the term of commence-
ment was subject to the condition precedent that the restrictions
against drilling imposed by ordinances be lifted. Although drilling
was allowed on nearby land, it was not allowed on plaintiff's land.
However, plaintiff hoped that the restrictions would be lifted in
the future so drilling would be permitted. The lease provided that
the lessors:
'[Hiave this day granted and leased and do hereby grant, lease, and let
* *' the premises; and fu-ther that the lease should remain in force for a
term of five years from the date the lessee may legally and peacefully
enter upon and drill on said leased premises, and so long thereafter as oil,
gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gasoline, or any of them is or can be pro-
duced from the leased premises .... 73
The court presumed that the parties executed the lease contem-
plating that the restrictions on drilling would be lifted within a
reasonable time or the contract would terminate.7 4 The court
stated "[t]here is nothing contained in the instrument or the cir-
cumstances attendant its execution which indicates even re-
motely that they intended or purposed to create a right in
perpetuity, or an objectionable restraint upon the alienation of
property."75 The lease was found valid.
The facts in Francis are distinguishable from the situation of a
top lease subject to a "so long thereafter" term. In Francis, the
court found that a time less than the limit of the Rule, was fore-
seeable from the circumstances by virtue of increased drilling in a
nearby zone which would likely cause a removal of restrictions in
the zone containing the lease. When a lease is subject to a "so
long thereafter" term, a reasonable time limit is not foreseeable
since it is quite possible that oil and gas will be produced long af-
70. BLACK'S iAW DICTIONA:Y 349 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) defines cy pres as follows:
As near as (possible). The rule of cy-pres is a rule for the construction of
instruments in equity, by which the intention of the party is carried out as
near as may be, when it would be impossible or illegal to give it literal
effect.
Id.
71. Stoltz, Wagner & Brown. v. Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552, 557 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
72. 102 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1939).
73. Id. at 735.
74. Id.
75. Id.
ter the period of the Rule thereby preventing commencement of
the top lease and making it void as a violation of the Rule.
III. DRAFTING TO AVOID THE RULE 76
In order to avoid the harsh consequences of the Rule against
Perpetuities and still make provision for top leases, the leases
should be drafted with a savings clause. 77 Proper draftsmanship
will prevent problems from arising under the Rule. The Wong
court offered the following language to avoid application of the
Rule:
The parties could simply have provided that the lessee's term would
commence on filing of the notice of completion, "but not later than twenty-
one years from the date of this agreement." If more time were desired,
the parties could specify, for example, "twenty-one years after the death
of the survivor of X, Y, and Z," these being healthy infants living at the
time of the agreement.
78
One commentator has suggested the following savings clause:
As to any provision in this agreement, the parties hereto do not intend
that there shall be any violation of the Rule against Perpetuities or any
related Rule. If any such violation should inadvertently occur, it is the
wish of the parties hereto that the appropriate court shall reform such
provision in such a way as to approximate most closely the intent of the
parties hereto within the limits permissible under such Rule or related
Rule.7
9
The author recommends the following savings clause which has
been drafted specifically to avoid perpetuities problems with top
leases.
This lease shall become effective upon termination of the [describe the
bottom lease] but no later than 21 years 8 o from the date of execution of
this lease. If this lease does not become effective within this 21 year pe-
riod, this lease shall be void. Lessee shall have no obligation to perform
under this lease until after this lease becomes effective. The effective date
of this lease shall be the anniversary date of the lease for the measure-
ment of all obligations of the Lessee under this lease.
76. See Leach & Logan, Perpetuities." A Standard Saving Clause to Avoid
Violations of the Rule, 74 HAav. L. REV. 1141 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Leach &
Logan].
77. The author expresses no opinion as to the validity of the following pro-
posed savings clause set forth in Leach & Logan. That clause states as follows: "I
hereby incorporate by reference the Standard Perpetuities Savings Clause set
forth in 74 Harvard Law Review 1141 (1961)." Leach & Logan, supra note 76, at
1150.
78. Wong v. Di Grazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 532 n.8, 386 P.2d 822, 827 n.8, 35 Cal. Rptr.
241, 246 n.8 (1963).
79. Reidy, Perpetuities and Mineral Development, 22 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
15, at 43-44 (1976). The central problem is that the parties must resort to a court
action to interpret the language of the document. This is often an expensive and
time consuming prospect.
80. This period may be as long as 60 years if desired under CAI Crv. CODE
§ 715.6 (Deering 1971) which states that: "No interest in real or personal property
which must vest, if at all, not later than 60 years after the creation of the interest
violates Section 715.2 of this code." Id.
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In addition to a well drafted savings clause, the doctrine of cy
pres8 1 may aid in preventing a top lease from violating the Rule.
However, in light of the recent growth of legal malpractice claims,
an attorney should not rely exclusively on the cy pres doctrine to
avoid a harsh application of the Rule against Perpetuities. In Lu-
cas v. HaMm, 82 the California Supreme Court held that the Rule
against Perpetuities is so esoteric that as a matter of law it cannot
be negligence for an attorney to violate it. This decision has been
strongly criticized,83 and may be overruled the next time the issue
is before the court. If the Lucas case is overruled, a savings
clause will be necessary, not only to prevent the top lease from
being invalidated, but also to prevent a possible malpractice claim
against the attorney.8 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Top leasing is becoming more popular as a means of acquiring
oil and gas rights. As a result of such popularity, it becomes in-
creasingly important for top leases to be properly drafted in order
to be valid under the Rule against Perpetuities. Other jurisdic-
tions may provide ways to prevent top leases from being rendered
invalid, but in California, it is clear that top leases will be in viola-
tion of the Rule unless an appropriate savings clause is included
in drafting such leases. To be absolutely certain the lease is not
held invalid under the Rule against Perpetuities, an appropriate
81. CAL. CIv. CODE § 715.5 (Deering 1971) provides:
No interest in real or personal property is either void or voidable as in vio-
lation of Section 715.2 of this code if and to the extent that it can be re-
formed or construed within the limits of that section to give effect to the
general intent of the creator of the interest whenever that general intent
can be ascertained. This section shall be liberally construed and applied
to validate such interest to the fullest extent consistent with such ascer-
tained intent.
Id.
82. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962).
83. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS, 1002-03
(1978).
84. Florida has solved the problem of leases commencing in the future by stat-
ute. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22 (West 1969) provides as follows:
(a) The Rule against Perpetuities does not apply to:
5. Leases to commence in the future or upon the happening of a fu-
ture event, but no such lease is valid unless the term thereof actually
commences in possession within 40 years from the date of execution
of the lease.
Id.
savings clause should be used in all jurisdictions when top leases
are taken.
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